The Lend-Lease Act: The Result of a Transformation in the American Mindset from Isolationism to Interventionism

The Second World War was the bloodiest conflict in history, with an estimate of over forty-five million dead (“BY THE NUMBERS”). Many consider that the entry of the United States of America into the war as a major turning point in the tide of the conflict. However, it is important to recognize that US’s engagement in the foreign conflict was not done without deliberation and without criticism. Many people in the United States, known as non-interventionist or isolationist, did not want to fight in Europe. The enrollment in the war was also not the result of a single event, a misconception for which Pearl Harbor holds a pedestal. Instead, the process for the United States to join World War II on the Allies’ side was a tedious one, one condemned by many, wherein the Lend Lease Act of 1941 was the hallmark for those pro-war and interventionist. The Lend Lease Act was, in effect, an outcome of the shift of popular motivations from the observed isolationism in the 1930s to interventionism.

In the early 1930s, the United States stood in a state of isolationism, wherein the majority of people did not want to participate in foreign affairs that did not directly affect the United States. This popular principle was not a new one, and it was a sentiment clearly expressed in George Washington’s farewell address, where he denounces both permanent alliances with the foreign world and the interweaving of the United States’ destiny with Europe’s as that would “entangle our peace and prosperity”, in ways that will not benefit the United States (Washington, 2008). By the 1930s, the non-entanglement attitudes, which had been temporarily dismissed upon the entrance into World War I, when President Woodrow Wilson called for interventionism to preserve world peace, returned with renewed fervor for several reasons. One was the First World War. Many Americans felt that WWI was a mistake, and that they should not repeat these mistakes again. In fact, in a 1935 Gallup Poll, 70% of Americans thought that intervention in WWI was a mistake (Schneider, 10). This regret and hostility towards the US’s involvement in WWI bred non-interventionist motivations. It would fuel changes in congress that would prevent the US from joining armed conflicts in Europe again. Moreover, many isolationists felt that the best way to protect the Americans and US interests was to avoid war with Europe. Further, many Americans wanted to look inwards for improvement and work on internal, rather than external affairs. This was bolstered by the Great Depression which ravaged the population and caused for many to feel that America needed to focus on domestic problems, augmented isolationism in the United States (“American Isolationism in the 1930s”).

More evidently, many of the major leaders of the isolationists came from the Mid-West, supporting the observation of a mid-western isolationist concentration. This cohort includes Republican Senators William Borah, Arthur Vandenberg, and Gerald Nye, as well the non-political Charles A. Lindberg. In more detail, William Borah was a Republican isolationist senator (who would also run for president as a republican nominee) from Idaho (“William E. Borah”). Arthur Vandenberg was a Republican Senator from Michigan who, before WWI, supported interventionism, but who, after being scalded by the Great War, became an ardent isolationist and was against both Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his policies (“Speeches Vandenberg”). Gerald Nye was a Republican Senator from North Dakoda who, in order to reinforce his belief that WWI was a mistake and that further foreign conflicts should be avoided, made the “Senate Munitions Committee” or the Nye committee. Its goal was to prove that the munitions manufactured during WWI helped the US become involved in the war and killed many American soldiers in the process of making the “merchants of death” rich (“Merchants of Death”). Finally, and perhaps most famously, Charles A. Lindbergh, the aviator from Detroit, Michigan, was an isolationist leader who would support Nazi Germany and become a founder and leader of the America First Committee, a committee dedicated to help spread non-interventionist opinions. Together, these people express that the Mid-West was the home of isolationist sentiment.

Also, many of the isolationist leaders, including those discussed earlier were Republicans, which is why the Republican Party tended to isolationist. Thus, maps revealing the where the Republicans won the vote also reveal where the highest concentration of isolationists are from. As seen on the map of the locational victories of the presidential election of 1940, the Republican Party was supported the most by those living in the Mid-West(“1940 Presidential Election”). It is thus clear through who the isolationist leaders represented and where in the nation these isolationist leaders were supported that Mid-West was where the isolationist most strongly held root.

The isolationists were also very influential during the 1930s because they were very well organized, not only in congress with the political prowess of those politicians, like the ones discussed previously, but in the public life, with organizations such as the America First Committee. The America First Committee was founded on September 4^th, 1940, and was led by Charles Lindbergh, Senator Nye, and General Robert E. Wood, as a response to the Destroyers for Bases Agreement, discussed later, with four goals: to stay out of foreign wars, to spread democracy by improving America, rather than by going to war, to not send ships to Europe (as that will enter America into war), and to build an impregnable defense to protect America and its democracy. The committee gained significant traction and claimed membership of 800,000 people. It was against FDR and lobbied against less stringent neutrality act and the Lend-Lease Act. Many of its members, including some of its leaders like Charles Lindbergh, did not want to fight Nazi Germany because they thought that it was too strong or they respected it. Overall, organizations like this one promoted non-interventionist sentiment both in the public and in congress, and its efficacy and organization gave the isolationist much power, which the interventionist lacked in the early part of the 1930s.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, relative to the isolationists, were the interventionists. Over the course of five years, from the presidential election of 1936 to the passing of the Lend-Lease Act and Pearl Harbor, there would be a fundamental change in the American viewpoint from primarily isolationist to primarily interventionist. This shift occurred first as people became concerned with concurrent events in Europe. Specific events that spurred this apprehension towards Europe include Germany’s breaking of the Versailles treaty in introduction of military conscription in 1935. In the next year, the Germans place the Gestapo above the law. By 1938, with events such as the annexation of Austria in March, the annexation of Czechoslovakia in October, and Kristallnacht in November, it was clear to an increasing number of Americans that Germany was a real threat. Not only that, but events in Japan, such as Japan’s invasion of China, in July of 1937, which started the war in Asia, also a caused concern for many Americans. In 1940, with the fall of France, almost all Americans agreed that Nazi Germany was a serious issue. At that point, the dispute between the interventionist and the isolationist was not on whether Germany was a threat, but rather on which viewpoint would protect Americans better.

As the conflict in Europe progressed (1936-1940), the American mindset began to move from isolationism and towards interventionism as the thesis of interventionism gained structure and as interventionists began to state what their beliefs and goals were. These decisions would soon lead to changes in legislature which would bring the United States closer to war. In general, the interventionists of this early period did not want to send troops to aid the Allies. Instead, they wanted to provide arms, military supplies, and monetary support to aid the allies. This was a goal that would be supported the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, discussed in more detail later. Interestingly, the motivations of interventionists and isolationist also began to align in this era. For example, in their contesting speeches, President Roosevelt, an interventionist, and Charles Lindbergh, the famous isolationist aviator, both used the reason that Western Civilization is at stake in order to justify their respective side (Wapshott, 145). During this early phase of the organization of interventionism, political figures began to arise, leading the interventionists and hotly contesting the topic with isolationists. These leaders included people like Henry Luce. Henry Luce was the founder of Life magazine, which he used to help spread his internationalist beliefs. In his most significant editorial “The American Century”, published in 1941, Luce calls for direct engagement in the war and for the US to overtake Britain as the World’s leader in international relations. He justified this using the arguments which earlier internationalists, including Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, and he was one of the most significant internationalist in the United States. Further, political leadership came, in large part, from President Franklin D. Roosevelt. As will be discussed, Roosevelt would become an outspoken and key interventionist and would push the United States towards war. In addition to both political and advertisement support, the interventionists were coalesced with popular support, which came from the large pool of French and British sympathizers. In short, the thesis interventionism began to take form with the growth of leadership in both the media and political realms and the support of French and British sympathizers (“Henry Luce”).

The cause of interventionists would not have progressed in the way it did had it not had the leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt to support it. Originally, Roosevelt was against interventionism, and in his election of 1933, Roosevelt did not mention foreign policy to the isolationist United States and instead decided to focus on internal struggles; especially the financial struggles that were still plaguing the United States since the crash of the stock market in 1929. After passing the controversial New Deal, Roosevelt passed the first and most stringent Neutrality Act of 1935. Together, these two initial actions show that Roosevelt originally behaved like and cooperated with the isolationists (Wapshott, 10). In the following election of 1936, Roosevelt won a complete victory (532:8) due to the popularity of his economic reforms and his continued promise to remain out of war (“1936 Presidential Election”). Despite this, however, he also said that he vowed to be less isolationist and more involved than his predecessor, suggesting that Roosevelt was beginning to publically move towards interventionism (Wapshott, 141). During his second presidency, he showed signs of his continual development towards interventionism. An example of this is his quarantine speech of 1937, where he warned foreign nations that continual aggression in foreign lands would likely lead to US involvement against the aggressors. In recapitulation, President Roosevelt underwent changes in his public persona as he adapted to the new needs of the country; this development would foreshadow the rivalry expressed between the internationalists and interventionists in the 1940 presidential election (“Quarantine Speech”).

At the end of his second term, Roosevelt decided to run for a historic third term, which would be one of the most pivotal points in US history, as he would end the period isolationism and spur internationalism. In the election of 1940, the Republican Party was headed by the wealthy businessman Wendell Willkie of New York. The official Republican stance on foreign policy was to support Britain with arms, but to not send troops to fight (“Republican Party”, 2004). Very similarly, President Roosevelt also promised not to send troops, but, instead, to send arms and munitions and to prepare for war (“Democrat Party”, 2004). However, Roosevelt’s speeches, such as the Quarantine Speech, and actions in the various weaker neutrality acts caused many isolationists to vote for Willkie, and against Roosevelt. Indeed, as his speeches were very internationalists. In 1940 he said:

There are those of us who wishfully insist, in innocence or ignorance or both, that the United States of America as a self-contained unit can live happily and prosperously, its future secure, inside a high wall of isolation while, outside, the rest of Civilization and the commerce and culture of mankind are shattered. (Wapshott, 155).

At the end of the election, Roosevelt won 449:82, with majorities in every region except the Mid-West and Vermont and Maine in New England (“1940 Presidential Election”). The Mid-West, who, as previously discussed, was the most isolationist, preferred Willkie over the more interventionist Roosevelt. The results in this election show that interventionist’s motivation are being adopted by the majority of Americans and show that by 1940, although not ready for outright engagement, the United States is girding for war.

From 1939 to 1941, the United States experienced the greatest acceleration in the movement from isolationism to interventionism as the general populous, as compared to individuals, began to convert to interventionism. At this point, the shift was due not only to the progression of war in Europe, but to the internal organization of the internationalists. Specifically, the cause of the internationalists was organized and spread by the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA), which was founded in May, 1940, by William Allen White. The committee believed that the best way to defend the United States against the fascist states abroad was to help Britain fight by providing physical and monetary aid. In the course of existence, the committee was in firm opposition with the America First Committee, which was founded after CDAAA in September, 1940. The committee would be very supportive of interventionist’s movements, including the Destroyers for Bases Agreement of 1940 and the Lend-Lease Act of 1941. In totality the CDAAA was a driving force in the increase of traction of internationalism among the general population and it served to develop the cause interventionism in the United States throughout the 1940s (Simkin, 2014).

With the foundation of organization like the CDAAA, the social leadership of citizens like Henry Luce, and the political leadership of those like President Roosevelt, many common Americans changed their stance on foreign affairs and became more interventionist. Over the period of 1939 to 1941, there was a steady motion away from isolationism and towards internationalism. For example, in 1939, after the acquisition of Austria, two-thirds of Americans reported that they wanted to support the allies in every way except for engagement in war (Wapshott, 118). Later that year, after the German occupation of Sudetenland and the Italian invasion of Albania, there was an increase in the percentage of Americans who wanted to provide arms to England in France from 31 to 50% (Wapshott, 132). Further, in October 1939, 84% of Americans wanted Britain to win the war, and 60% wanted to send all help short of engagement in the war (Wapshott, 147). Overall, by late 1939 interventionism was growing stronger and was becoming, increasingly, the standard in American opinions on foreign affairs.

As the popular vote moved away from isolationism, so too did opinions in congress, illustrating once again the American progression towards internationalism. In congress undecided senators and house members began to support interventionism, and previously ardent isolationist converted away from isolationism. In 1939, Republican Senators Styles and Taft, of New Hampshire and Ohio respectively were among this group of people. The former of the two admitted that he was “glad the President [admitted] he made a mistake in signing the Neutrality Act and that the Congress made a mistake in passing it” (Wapshott, 146). The latter would become a devoted supporter of the cash-and-carry policy and he voted against more stringent Neutrality Acts (Wapshott, 132). Others include John H. Boehne, who was originally an isolationist, but who later agreed with the amendment of the strict Neutrality Act of 1935, and the Republican nominee, Wendell Willkie who ran in the 1940 election. Wendell Willkie, after losing the election in 1940, became one of Roosevelt’s most loyal supporter, and he embraced some Roosevelt’s most controversial proposition, including the Lend-Lease Act in 1941 and, later, the unlimited aid of Britain in the war against Nazi Germany (“Wendell Willkie”). Moreover, the makeup of the House of Republicans and the Senate changed drastically over the 1930s. In the seventy-second congress, from 1931 to 1933, there was a republican majority in the both the House of Representatives (218:216) and in the Senate (48:47). By the seventy-fifth, the Democrats held large majorities in the both the House of Representatives (333:89) and the Senate (75:17) (“Composition of Congress”). Overall, this shift in political power from the Democrats to the Republicans throughout the 1930s illustrates the American movement away from isolationism and towards interventionism.

As a result of this shift in the congressional makeup throughout the 1930s, many changes were made in laws and regulations, especially regarding foreign policy. At the height of the isolationists’ regulatory achievements stands the Neutrality Act of 1935 and 1936. In them, the congress passed restrictions on America’s ability to associate and become involved with belligerent states in three ways: by placing an embargo on the sale of arms to belligerents, by forbidding American ships from entering war zones or from being armed, and by barring Americans from traveling on belligerent ships (“Neutrality Act of 1935”). In the Neutrality Act of 1937, the previous Neutrality Acts were amended to allow for the trade of non-armament related goods with belligerent nations, on the basis that the belligerent nations pay for the goods in cash and collect the supplies at the US ports on their own ships; this was known as a cash-and-carry basis (“Neutrality Act of 1937”). In 1939, a neutrality act was passed which extended the cash-and-carry principle to arms (“Neutrality Act of 1939”). This neutrality act strongly sidestepped the purpose and intent of the original stringent Neutrality Act, and it aligned the United States with the Allies to a much greater degree (“The Neutrality Acts”). The gradual and successive relaxation of the neutrality laws shows how the American public, and thus its congressmen, were increasingly interventionists. The change is illustrated to an even greater extent with the Destroyers for Bases Agreement, passed on September 2^nd, 1940. Although the Neutrality Act of 1939 allowed the British to purchase war products from the United States, the British soon ran out of capital to sustain their armies’ demand. As a result of this, Roosevelt pushed for the Destroyers for Bases Agreement, which would allow for the United states to give the British over 50 military ships for land in Newfoundland and the Caribbean, which the United States would then use as locations for naval and air bases (“Destroyers”). The passing of this agreement, which was popular and had a 60% approval rating in the United States, foreshadowed the passing of the more extreme Lend-Lease Act by being the first case where the United States supported the Allies without direct payment (“Lend Lease”)(“Wapshott, 192”). It was in essence the first example of the United States aligning itself with the Allies.

The most radical act passed before the United States official was engaged in World War

II  was the Lend-Lease Act, which aligned the United States with the allies and drew America

towards war. Passed on March 11, 1941, the Lend-Lease Act allowed America to provide arms, munitions, and other war goods to (originally) Britain, without direct payment from the belligerent state and without having to collect the war goods from the United States on belligerent ships. Instead, the country receiving the aid was to use the munitions and arms and then to return what was used after the conflict. The United States was also to be repaid, not monetarily, but with a ‘consideration’ which “would primarily consist of joint action directed towards the creation of a liberalized international economic order in the postwar world”. When announcing the Lend-Lease Act to the public, he used the analogy of a garden hose, where, in the event of a neighbor’s fire, one should lend their neighbor a hose for the duration of the fire and then retrieve it after the incident. President Roosevelt also proclaimed that America would be the Arsenal of Democracy through this bill (“Lend-Lease”). The bill was very popular and was passed in the House of Representatives by a large majority of 317:71 and a majority 60:31 in the Senate (Chambers, “Lend”). Over its existence, the Lend-Lease Act dispensed over $50 billion to over thirty countries, and was a vital part in supporting the war effort (“Lend-Lease”).

In conclusion, the passing of the Lend-Lease Act, especially by such a large majority, is an event that would have been inconceivable in the early 1930s. It occurred due to the transformation in the American mindset away from isolationism and towards interventionism as the war in Europe progressed, as Americans increasingly felt that foreign intervention was the best way to defend America against Germany, and as strong leaders organized the internationalist viewpoint and garnered more popular support. It is clear that the institution of the Lend-Lease Act was a corner stone in aligning the United States with the Allies and bringing the United States into the War. Overall, it is evident that the attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was not the reason for which the United States joined the Second World War. Instead, the engagement of the United States in the world conflict was the result of a tedious transition in the American mindset in regards to foreign policy towards internationalism, as illustrated by the Lend-Lease Act. The attack at Pearl Harbor was clearly not the cause, but the trigger, for United States entry into the war.

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